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Abstract 
We aim to improve the policy relevance of the aggregate welfare indicators regarding the economic 
and environmental features of farming practices. First, an analytical framework for measurement of 
environmentally adjusted net national product for agricultural sector is provided. Second, shadow 
pricing  of  direct  disutility  of  environmental  deterioration  is  illustrated  with  implications  of  the 
Finnish water protection policy measures restricting the use of manure on conventional and organic 
livestock farms during the period 1994-2002. Our simulated shadow prices per cubic meter manure 
are  quite  considerable  reflecting  the  potentially  high  opportunity  costs  in  terms  of  value added 
forgone if the only option to comply with regulation is to cut output. In practice, the organic farms 
seem  to  comply  well  with  current  regulation,  and  the  environmentally  harmful  contribution  of 
conventional farms to welfare is relatively small. 
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1. Introduction 
Organic  farming  has  become  an  important  option  for  policies  promoting  food  safety  and 
environmental quality of food production (COM (2004) 415 final). By ruling out the use of synthetic 
fertilizers and other chemicals organic farming represents an environmentally ‘clean’ technology 
which can be viewed as a constrained version of conventional farming in agriculture. Its potential 
environmental friendliness does not come without a cost. Yields in organic farming are in general 
significantly lower than under conventional management, even though the yield differences vary 
between products and to a certain extent between countries. (Lampkin et al. 1999, Offerman and 
Nieberg 2000, Zanoli and Gambelli 1999) 
 
Depending  on  the  farming  strategies  adopted  also  the  environmental  impacts  will  change 
accordingly.  It  is  necessary  to  evaluate  the  existing  measures  of  economic  performance  of 
conventional  and  organic  farming  technologies  from  a  point  of  view  of  environment,  since 
conventional economic indicators may be misguided. We aim to improve the policy relevance of the 
aggregate  welfare  indicators  regarding  the  economic  and  environmental  features  of  farming 
practices.  
 
We  provide  an  analytical  framework  for  measurement  of  environmentally  adjusted  net  national 
product  for  agricultural  sector.
1  Agricultural  income  (value  added)  forms  part  of  conventional 
national  income  accounting.  When  a  Net  National  Product (NNP)  is calculated in  practice, the 
measurement of economic activity is based on market transactions and market prices. At least in 
principle, the environmental impacts of products can be traced back to the technology used in the 
production. Different production technologies imply different environmental performance, and this 
should be  reflected in welfare accounting.
2  Productivity  measurement faces a similar challenge. 
What is crucial to notice in decision making it that productivity measurement involves commonly 
used economic efficiency measures that are based on the prevailing prices. This may be a problem 
for evaluation of sustainability, since market prices of final products do not capture social costs or 
benefits  such  as  environmental  quality.  Our  analysis  seeks  to  develop  more  comprehensive 
indicators  of  sustainability  in  agriculture  for  policy  makers  by  showing  how  the  conventional 
indicators of economic performance should be completed.  
                                                            
1 For a good overview of the extensive literature on environmental (green) accounting, see Heal and Kriström (2003). 
2 The link between green accounting and efficiency measurement has been elaborated in, e.g., Huhtala (1998, 2003).    4 
In their study on environmental accounting in agriculture, Hrubovcak et al. (2000) have provided a 
theoretical framework with an empirical illustration to incorporate the environmental impacts of 
agricultural  production  into  the  existing  income  accounts.    Here,  we  take  a step further  in our 
analysis  and  place  a  special  emphasis  on  environmental  impacts  and technology.  We  introduce 
organic farming as an alternative technology for comparison purposes. Furthermore, we carry out 
shadow pricing of direct disutility of environmental deterioration of each technology using farm 
accounting data. This is a most natural way to proceed as the agricultural value added at the national 
level is based on output produced at the farm level. 
 
The empirical shadow pricing method we apply here has its origin in Färe et al. (2001, 2002). The 
purpose is to draw a distinction between good and bad outputs. By exploiting the duality theory, the 
shadow-pricing model can be derived from the output distance function using the envelope theorem. 
Since the cost for reducing bad outputs is in terms of forgone revenue from good outputs, each bad 
output  commands  its  own  shadow  price  at  the  margin.  In  other  words,  social  costs  of 
environmentally detrimental outputs can be estimated assuming that abatement is only possible by 
adjusting  agricultural  production,  or  output/value  added  at  the  farm  level.  Given  the  estimated 
opportunity cost of production, we have an upper bound for a shadow price of bad produced.  
 
Our data consist of Finnish livestock farms in unbalanced panels, extending over the period 1994-
2002. There are 2086 observations for 259 conventional farms and 230 observations for 51 organic 
farms.  The  directional  output  distance  function  is  estimated  on  input  and  output  variables 
constituting  these  panels.  In  addition  to  a  good  output  (value  added)  a  bad  output  (manure) is 
produced. Inputs include capital, labor, energy, land, and other materials. The point of departure for 
our  empirical  shadow  pricing  is  an  assumption  that  the  current  Finnish  regulation  reflects  the 
environmental preferences of the society. With certain exceptions, maximally 15 kg phosphorus is 
allowed to be spread per hectare cultivated land annually. The regulation must be taken into account 
in application of manure as well. If this policy measure is restrictive, the performance of the farms 
change as the environment becomes a factor to be taken into account in the economic maximization 
problem. Moreover, since an undesirable by-product (manure surplus) is produced, its effects on the 
environment  have  negative  welfare  consequences  that  should  be  taken  into  account  in  policy 
making. The shadow price implicitly reveals the value that the regulatory authorities put on the last 
unit  manure  spread  on  land  causing  environmental  damages.  If  the  authorities  know  the   5 
environmental  preferences  of  the  society  and  know  how  and to  what extent undesirable  output 
affects the environment, the shadow price is the correct value from a socially optimal point of view. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a simple growth model in which organic 
nutrient  surplus  (manure)  is  a  by-product  of  all  agricultural  production  both  in  organic  and 
conventional farming. Section 3 shows how shadow prices can be derived using directional output 
distance functions. In section 4 an empirical application based on a Finnish FADN sample illustrates 
the  implications  for  measurement  of  value  added  (NNP)  from  the  Finnish  agricultural  sector. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. National accounting incorporating undesirable output 
Our analytical framework is based on national accounting to identify the components of value added 
generating growth in the agricultural sector. The framework builds upon the result of Weitzman 
(1976) which proves how net national welfare measurement can be theoretically justified. The well-
known result states the valuation principle for an economy maximizing utility subject to capital 
stock over time. Formally, a first best optimal solution can be derived by setting up a social planner's 
utility  maximization  problem  over  time.  Utility  is  derived  from  consumption,  C,  whereas  the 
accumulation of capital over time, dK/dt = f(K) – C, is determined by total output, f(K), minus 
consumption, i.e., net investments, I. As shown by Weitzman, a linear support of the Hamiltonian 
along the optimal path corresponds to national welfare, or NNP=C+I. We use the above accounting 
rule as a guiding principle to build up an output measurement framework for the agricultural sector. 
The basic model will be completed with environmental impacts of production.  
 
The agricultural sector produces conventional food products, c, and organic food products, g, such 
that production of consumption goods in total is C=c+g. Capital, K, is a sector specific input. 
Simultaneously with production of goods, a bad output, b=￿C, causing environmental degradation is 
generated.  The environmentally negative or bad output we model in the empirical illustration is 
manure generated in animal production as excessive amounts of manure spoil recreation possibilities 
due to odors or water pollution impacts. The by-product causing nuisance enters into the economy as 
an  externality  through  preferences  as  a  separate  argument  in  the  utility  function  and  therefore 
inevitably decreases utility directly. The utility function takes the form U(C,b) with UC>0 and Ub<0. 
In the social planner’s optimization problem, the objective function   6 
 
    [ ] ￿
¥
-
o
rtdt e b C U ) , (  
 
is discounted over time by a constant social interest rate, r > 0. The objective is maximized subject 
to an equation of motion and an initial condition of the capital stock, K 
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We form the current value Hamiltonian for the social planner optimization problem above  
 
(1)  ) ) ( ( ) , ( C K f C C U H - + = l a . 
 
The  Hamiltonian  is  to  be  maximized  subject  to  C  to  achieve  a  socially  optimal  allocation  of 
resources. We write the first order conditions 
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What  is  crucial  for  our  empirical  analysis  on  measuring  the  environmental  performance  of 
agricultural  sector  is  to  determine  how  to  include  the  environmental  impacts  in the accounting 
framework for value added. This can be done with the help of the Hamiltonian and the optimality 
conditions above. By linearizing the utility function, we have  
 
K C U C U b C ￿ l a + × + × = H . 
   7 
Dividing the linearized current value Hamiltonian by the marginal utility of consumption (assuming 
that  C U  is constant), we arrive at a monetary value measure of a green net national product (GNNP) 
which corresponds to a welfare measure that includes measurable environmental impacts 
  
(1’) 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
b C
b
C
b
C
b
b K f
U
U
K f K
U
U
C
U
U
P N N G ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a a a
t
+ = + + + =
×
 
 
where t denotes the shadow price of bad output which is valued using the ratio of marginal utilities. 
Recalling  that  the  conventional  NNP  is  defined  as  consumption  plus 
investments ) ( ) ( K f C K f C K C NNP = - + = + =
×
, or implicitly assuming that b=0, equation (1’) 
suggests that two adjustments should be made for the conventional NNP when b>0:  (1) The by-
product, b=￿f(K), should be taken into account in the output possibilities set (and in output frontier 
being estimated), and (2) the negative contribution of bad output should be shadow-priced by t < 0  
(as  Ub  <  0).  The  product of these components  should be included in  measurement of national 
product.  
 
Our primary intentions are not only to suggest welfare indicators that incorporate environmental 
features  of  farming  practices,  but  also  to  suggest  an  alternative  empirical  framework  for 
approximating farms actual contribution to welfare. An interesting question is then how to measure 
the shadow prices that a society places on undesirable outputs. Here, environmental regulation can 
prove helpful. 
 
In purpose of alleviating leakage of nutrients to the waters, the Finnish authorities have imposed 
environmental regulation limiting the application of fertilizers, including organic manure, on the 
fields. Farms are allowed to use maximally 15 kg phosphorous per hectare land. If this policy is 
restrictive the farms’ performance should change as the bad output becomes a factor to be taken into 
account in the economic optimization of production. Furthermore, since this also means that the 
authorities  hold  the  view  that  the  by-product  is  undesirable  its  effects  on  the  environment  has 
negative welfare consequences that should be reflected in national accounting. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1.   8 
The output possibilities set, P(x), includes now both outputs; C (good) and b (bad). In this particular 
case,  the  regulatory  authorities  pursue  an  environmental  policy  that  imposes  maximal  allowed 
quantity of manure use in production. The restriction in effect is illustrated by the bold vertical line, 
b¢, which constitutes the dividing-line between subsets of output bundles where manure is and isn’t 
giving rise to negative external effects. Shadow prices of manure are given by the slopes of the 
frontier. Given the regulation, the shadow price implicitly reveals that the authorities consider the 
last unit manure spread on land to cause negative external effects, or environmental damages, at the 
value of ￿’. If the authorities know the environmental preferences of the society and know how and 
to what extent undesirable output causes damage, they impose an optimal restriction and the shadow 
price, ￿’ , reveals the correct damage value from a socially optimal point of view.  
 
On the cost side, the value of shadow price of bad output depends on how large a reduction in the 
undesirable output is wanted with respect to an increase in the desirable output. At point (C’,b’) the 
shadow  price  of  an  additional  unit  of  bad  output  is  ￿’<  0,  which  is  the  revenue  forgone, 
C p b ¶ × = ×¶ - ) ' (t ,  1 = ¶b  due to the last reduced unit of bad output. This reflects the marginal rate 
of transformation between bad and good outputs and, as such, can be interpreted as the marginal 
abatement cost at point (C’,b’).  
 
If  the  farm  faces  a  shadow  price  of  manure,  0 £ q ,  lower  than  the  price  corresponding  to  the 
restriction line,  0 < ¢ t , i.e., at any point on the frontier to the left of the line, e.g., at point A’, the 
manure use is not causing any environmental damages. However, if the farm faces a shadow price at 
any point on the frontier to the right of the restriction line, e.g., at point B’, the manure use in 
production gives rise to external effects that harm the environment (as indicated by the stringency of 
regulation  limiting the nutrient  use).  The  price of this negative externality  is 
B B q - ¢ =t t  and, 
consequently,  the  value  of  the  total  environmental  damages  from  producing  at  point  B  is 
) ( b b
B B ¢ - × t .
3 
 
Given  the  accounting  rule  in  equation  (1’)  and  using  the  shadow  price  information  from  the 
regulation adopted, the expression that approximate farms’ actual contribution to welfare is 
(1’’)  ) (
ikt ikt ikt ikt ikt b b C GNNP ¢ - × + = t ,  
                                                            
3 This corresponds to  b t  in equation (1’).   9 
(i) 
ikt ikt x R b 4 × = ¢  
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where  4 x   denotes  land  (hectare)  and  R   the  maximally  allowed manure use (per hectare). The 
expression in (i) means that every farm, k, of type i (organic or conventional) faces a unique manure 
restriction, 
ikt b¢ , in terms of absolute quantities at every point of time, t. Furthermore, 
ikt nee  denotes 
the  negative  external  effects  (see  Figure  1),  and  t¢  denotes  the  shadow  price  of  manure 
corresponding  to  the  restriction.  The  negative  external  effects  take  non-negative  values,  which 
means that for the observations where 
ikt ikt b b ¢ <  these effects are set to zero. Furthermore, t¢ is set 
equal to the simulated value of  q¢, i.e., the shadow price that the representative farm faces when 
satisfying  the  restriction.  The  calculated  t¢  implicitly  reveals  the  value  that  the  regulatory 
authorities ascribe to the negative external effects on average when imposing the restriction. That is, 
ikt ikt q - ¢ =t t  is the value of the environmental damages from one more unit of manure that exceeds 
the maximally allowed quantity of manure use. 
 
As expressed in equation (1’’), manure is an inevitable by-product such that to be able to produce 
the good output, C, the farm has to produce some bad output, b. If nee > 0, this also means that the 
farm has to produce the additional negative value  ) (C nee ¶ × t  to produce an additional unit good 
output. Hence, to compensate for the negative value when calculating GNNP for this particular unit, 
the social net revenue is  C C nee p GNNP ¶ × ¶ × + = ¶ )) ( ( t ,  1 = p .
4 The changes in the flow variables, 
C ¶   and  ) (C nee ¶ ,  can  be  regarded  as  taking  place  during  a  certain  year  and,  therefore,  the 
contribution to the GNNP for that particular year can be calculated.
5 
 
3. Shadow pricing and directional distance functions 
The  most  recent  development  in  efficiency  measurement  has  extended  the  analyses  to  include 
undesirable, polluting commodities that are outputs from some production process (see, e.g., Färe 
and Grosskopf 1998). To calculate shadow prices of bad outputs, in our case manure, a shadow-
pricing model originating from Färe et al. (2002) is used (see also Färe and Grosskopf 2004, and 
                                                            
4 If C is measured in monetary terms then p = 1. 
5 Annual production is assumed to be taking place at the margin.   10 
Färe et al. 2005).
6 Formally, let 
M
M C C C + Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J b b b + Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  be vectors of good 
and bad outputs, respectively, and let 
N
N x x x + Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  be a vector of inputs. The technology of 
reference  is  the  output  possibilities  set,  ) (x P ,  which  for  a  given  vector  of  inputs  denotes  all 
technically  feasible  output  vectors.  This  output  set  is assumed to  be convex and  compact with 
} 0 , 0 { ) 0 ( = P . Furthermore, inputs and good outputs are assumed to be freely disposable and bad 
outputs only weakly disposable. Finally, good outputs are assumed to be null-joint with the bad 
outputs. This means that good outputs cannot be produced without producing bad outputs. The 
directional output distance function is defined on  ) (x P , as 
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which then inherits its properties from  ) (x P . The solution, 
* b , gives the maximum expansion and 
contraction  of  good  outputs  and  bad  outputs,  respectively.  The  vector  ) 1 , 1 ( - = - = = b C g g g  
specifies the direction in which an output vector,  ) ( ) , ( x P b C Î , is scaled so as to reach the boundary 
of the output set at  ) ( ) , ( x P g b g C b C Î × - × +
* * b b , where  ) ; , , ( g b C x D =
* b . This means that the 
producer  becomes  more  technically  efficient  when  simultaneously  increasing  good  outputs  and 
decreasing bad outputs. The distance function takes the value of zero for technically efficient output 
vectors on the boundary of  ) (x P , whereas positive values apply to inefficient output vectors below 
the boundary. The higher the value the more inefficient is the output vector. Finally, the directional 
output distance function satisfies the translation property 
 
(6)  ( ) ( ) a a a - = × - × + g b C x D g g b g C x D b C ; , , ; , ,        
 
where a  is a positive scalar. 
 
When deriving the output shadow-pricing model the duality between the distance function and the 
revenue function is exploited. Let 
M
M p p p + Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J q q q - Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  represent absolute 
                                                            
6 Marklund (2003) provides an application of this model to the Swedish pulp industry, together with a thorough 
overview of the development of the estimations of bad output shadow prices. See also Marklund and Samakovlis (2003) 
and Marklund (2004).   11 
prices of good and bad outputs, respectively. Then the relative shadow prices of bad outputs, in 
terms of the m:th good output, can be calculated from  
 
(7)  J j
C
g b C x D
b
g b C x D
p
q
m j m
j ,..., 1 ,
) ; , , ( ) ; , , (
= ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
¶
¶
¶
¶
=      
 
which is the marginal rate of transformation between the  th j :  bad output and the  th m:  good 
output, MRTjm, where  0 ) ( < ¶ × ¶ m C D  and  0 ) ( ³ ¶ × ¶ j b D . The shadow price is then measured in 
terms of decreased production of Cm, which has to be met when reducing bj marginally. 
 
4. Estimation and results  
Following, e.g., Färe et al. (2005) the directional output distance function is parameterised by using 
a  quadratic  flexible  functional  form  and  estimated  using  an  econometric,  COLS  estimating, 
procedure.
7 This means that the distance function is first estimated by OLS and then ‘corrected’ by 
adding  the  largest  residual  to  the  intercept.  The  corrected  distance  function,  CD(.),  takes  non-
negative values and for farm type i (organic or conventional) and farm k in time period t, it can be 
written as 
(8) 
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where  k k  and  t j  are parameters representing farm and time specific effects, respectively, and  i r  is 
a parameter that represents farm type effects. This is the expression to differentiate when calculating 
shadow prices of outputs, in accordance with equation (7). The functional form in (8) satisfies non-
                                                            
7 Regarding the COLS estimator, see, e.g., Greene (1993). The particular approach adopted is used in Lovell et al. 
(1994), where, e.g., a Shephard output distance function is estimated. The COLS procedure applied on the directional 
output distance function is in more detail described in Marklund and Samakovlis (2003).   12 
negativity,  symmetry,  n n n n ¢ ¢ =a a ,  n n ¢ ¹ ,  m m m m ¢ ¢ = b b ,  m m ¢ ¹ ,  and  j j j j ¢ ¢ =g g ,  j j ¢ ¹ ,  and  the 
translation property in equation (5). 
 
In our estimations C1 denotes the sum of organic good output, g, and conventional good output, c. 
Manure is denoted b1, and x1 denotes capital, x2 labor, x3 energy, x4 land, and x5 other materials. As 
in Färe et al. (2005), before estimating the expression in (8), the data are normalized by dividing 
each output and each input by its mean value,  ) , ( b C  and  x , respectively. This means that when 
estimating the distance function one unit of each variable equals its mean value. 
 
The original farm level data come from Finnish bookkeeping farms that participated in the Farm 
Accountancy  Data  Network  (FADN)  during  1994-2002.  The  selected  conventional  and  organic 
animal farm data samples consist of farms that have a share of livestock return of total return that is 
at  least  60  percent.  They  are  considered  to  be  livestock  (milk  and  beef)  specialized  farms. 
Furthermore,  farms  for  which  there  only  is  one  single  observation  are  excluded.  This  result  in 
unbalanced panels, extending over the period 1994-2002 and consisting of 2086 observations for 
259 conventional farms and 230 observations for 51 organic farms. Descriptive statistics are given 
in Table 1. 
 
Results 
The  directional  output  distance  function  is  estimated  on  mean  normalized  data,  using  a  COLS 
procedure. The particular procedure used imposes the function properties of translation, symmetry, 
and non-negativity. Further tests reveal that the estimated function satisfies null-jointness for 1257 
out  of  2316  observations  (60  percent),  and  monotonicity  in  good  and  bad  outputs  for  all 
observations. The parameters of the estimated distance function are provided in Table 2.
8  
 
To be able to measure welfare in accordance with equation (1’’) the shadow prices reflecting the 
stringency  of  regulation  t¢s  for  each  farm  type  (“average”  compound,  ￿’,  organic,  ￿’
org,  and 
conventional, ￿’
con, i.e., representative by technology) are first calculated for given  b¢ and  C¢. In 
practice,  t¢s  are  calculated  at  mean  of  inputs,  x ,  assuming  technical  efficiency,  i.e., 
0 ) ; , , ( = ¢ ¢ g b C x CD .  The  values  for  b¢  are derived from regulation according to which Finnish   13 
farms are allowed to use maximally 15 kg phosphorous per hectare land; this corresponds to the use 
of maximally 20 m
3 manure per hectare, i.e., R = 20 in equation (1’’).
9 The representative compound 
animal farm uses  4 x  = 38.86 hectare land in production (see Table 1) and, hence, the maximally 
allowed use of manure is  b¢ = 20*38.86 = 777 m
3. By simulation, using the estimated distance 
function, it is established that 777 m
3 manure corresponds to C¢ = 412,610 FIM. Given these output 
quantities, and mean quantities of inputs,  x , the representative compound farm faces a shadow price 
amounting to  q¢ =  -675.45 FIM (roughly ￿ 115), which corresponds to t¢ as shown in Figure 1. 
Similar simulations have been carried out for calculating shadow prices reflecting the stringency of 
regulation for representative organic and conventional farms. The simulated maximally allowed use 
of manure and corresponding shadow price for a representative organic and conventional farm are 
org b¢   =  20*47.40 = 948  m
3,
org ' t   =  -610.24 and 
con b¢  =  20*37.91  =  758 m
3 ,
con ' t  = -683.20, 
respectively.  
 
The shadow prices imposed by regulation can be compared with the shadow prices estimated for the 
representative farms in sample as reported in Table 4.  To certain extent the shadow prices reflect 
the farming technologies adopted. Given their larger acreage, the organic farms are less constrained 
by the manure restriction than the conventional farms on average. In general, the simulated shadow 
prices within the range of ￿ 100 – 115 per cubic meter manure are quite considerable and reflect the 
opportunity cost of value added forgone if the only abatement option is to cut output.   
 
Next, the price of the negative externality, 
ikt ikt q - ¢ =t t , is calculated for each farm. The result 
shows that there are 910 observations for which
ikt q < ¢ t , i.e., for which shadow prices are calculated 
on the technological frontier to the right of the restriction line in Figure 1. As can be seen from 
Table 3 (upper part), generally, one unit external effects (additionally one m
3 manure overuse) , 
) (
ikt ikt b b ¢ - ¶ , caused by organic farms commands a social cost of nearly 50 percent higher than the 
social cost of one unit external effects caused by conventional farms when excluding those farms 
with  0 =
ikt t .  However,  the  outcome  is  reversed  when  those  farms  with  zero  social  costs  are 
included in the calculation (Table 3 lower part). An obvious reason for this disparity should be that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 Additionally, to check for possible multicollinearity problems the condition number (see, e.g., Greene (2000)) of the 
data matrix is calculated, revealing the test statistic value of 235. This is quite good considering that a flexible functional 
form is representing farm technology. 
9 Depending on the livestock category, the phosphorus (P) content of one cubic meter manure is approximately 1 kg. 
However, only 75 percent of the potential P content of manure is “bio-available” according to regulation.   14 
the organic farm in general uses manure more extensively in production than does the conventional 
farm due to its larger acreage (see Table 1), but if organic farms violate the manure restriction they 
do it more seriously than the conventional farms do.  
 
Having derived the necessary components of GNNP (t¢and
ikt b¢ ), the contribution to welfare from 
representative Finnish farms (by farm type) is approximated according to equation (1’’). The NNP 
results  are  provided  in  Table  5.  On  average,  the  contribution  from  the  Finnish  animal  farms 
amounted  to  FIM  348,990  during  1994-2002,  having  accounted  for  the  value  of  the  total 
environmental damages amounting to FIM 390. Furthermore, during the same period, organic farms 
contributed less to welfare than did the conventional farms, specifically FIM 302,440 compared to 
FIM 354,050. The organic contribution is 85 percent of the contribution from conventional farms. 
However, from Table 5, it may also be inferred that conventional farms, by overuse of manure, 
cause environmental damages at a value that is on average FIM 510 (￿ 85) per farm.  
 
It  seems that  Finnish animal farms  generally use phosphorus  by complying with environmental 
regulation.  A  majority  of  the  farms  apply  less  manure  than  is  maximally  allowed  by  policy. 
However, we have data on potential manure amount only and the use of synthetic phosphorus by 
conventional farms is not accounted at all. It may be alarming that potential manure use already 
makes  some  of  the  conventional  farms  exceed  the  restriction.  For  these  farms,  contracts  for 
exchanging manure with farms having excess land area for spreading manure might be attractive. 
Interestingly, farms that are willing to apply manure produced outside their own farm are paid a 
subsidy of ￿ 65 per hectare. This makes about ￿ 3.25 (or FIM 20) per cubic meter manure which is 
perhaps surprisingly close to our estimate on the social costs reported in Table 3. In this sense, our 
analysis  gives  justification  for  the  subsidy  level  chosen  by  the  Finnish  policy  makers  as  it 
corresponds well to our estimate on the value of damage calculated by opportunity costs.    
 
5. Conclusions 
Our  theoretical  framework  for national accounting takes into account environmental  impacts of 
alternative production technologies in agriculture. A formalized optimization problem helps to keep 
track  of  direct  and  indirect  environmental  effects.  We  illustrated  our  analytical  findings  by 
considering water protection policy measures in the Finnish agriculture. In purpose of alleviating 
leakage of phosphorus and nitrogen to the waters, the authorities have imposed restrictions that limit   15 
the use of organic manure as a fertilizer. If this policy measure is effective, the performance of the 
farms  change  as  the  environment  becomes  a  factor  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  economic 
maximization problem. Furthermore, since an undesirable by-product is produced, its effects on the 
environment have negative welfare consequences that should be reflected in national accounting. 
The shadow price implicitly reveals the value that the regulatory authorities put on the last unit 
manure spread on land causing environmental damages. If the authorities know the environmental 
preferences  of  the  society  and  know  how  and  to  what  extent  undesirable  output  affects  the 
environment, the shadow price is the correct value from a socially optimal point of view.  
 
Our simulated shadow prices per cubic meter manure are quite considerable reflecting the high 
opportunity costs in terms of value added forgone if the only option to comply with regulation is to 
cut output. In practice, the organic farms seem to comply well with current regulation, and the 
environmentally harmful contribution of conventional farms to welfare is relatively small. However, 
we had data on potential  amounts  of manure produced on  farms only and the use of synthetic 
phosphorus  by  conventional  farms  was  not  accounted  at  all.  It  may  be  alarming  that  potential 
manure  use  already  makes  some  of the conventional farms exceed  the  restriction. Finally, it is 
interesting from a policy point of view that our estimate on the value of damage per cubic meter 
manure based on opportunity costs is very close to the level of subsidy applied in manure exchange 
contracts of Finnish the agri-environmental schemes implemented by the government.    16 
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Figure 1. Production frontier, P(x), for good output, C, and  bad output, b,  when inputs, x, used and 
shadow prices, q’, q
A, q
B. Environmental regulation limiting the amount of bad produced is denoted 
by b’.  
q
A 
q
B  ￿’=q’ 
B* 
A* 
A 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables in the output distance function, representing animal 
farm technology; mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). 
 
Compound animal farms 
Variables  Year  Number 
of obs  C1  b1  x1  X2  x3  x4  x5 
94-02  2316  349.38 
(175.61) 
678.61 
(327.30) 
487.98 
(385.39) 
4894.20 
(1550.55) 
27.84 
(15.44) 
38.86 
(21.42) 
192.50 
(119.04) 
Min    1.51  103.50  7.99  988.00  4.33  8.52  21.42 
Max    1418.05  2672.00  2938.44  11921.00  163.64  178.41  1025.86 
 
Conventional animal farms 
Variables  Year  Number 
of obs  c  b1  x1  x2  x3  x4  x5 
94-02  2086  354.56 
(170.36) 
675.51 
(313.01) 
482.72 
(383.92) 
4936.22 
(1534.25) 
27.74 
(15.36) 
37.91 
(19.51) 
192.90 
(114.73) 
Min    3.83  103.50  7.99  9.88  4.33  8.52  31.80 
Max    1173.48  2052.00  2938.44  11921.00  163.64  135.44  1025.86 
 
Organic animal farms 
Variables  Year  Number 
of obs  g  b1  x1  x2  x3  x4  x5 
94-02  230  302.44 
(212.23) 
706.64 
(435.87) 
535.70 
(396.18) 
4513.10 
(1646.36) 
28.73 
(16.10) 
47.40 
(32.99) 
188.83 
(152.96) 
Min    1.51  172.00  49.95  1159.00  5.74  12.30  21.42 
Max    1418.05  2672.00  1622.71  10855.00  98.58  178.41  1016.71 
 
C1 = c + g = outputs, except direct payments, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
b1 = manure, m
3 
x1 = capital, machinery and buildings, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
x2 = labour, hours 
x3 = energy, fuel and electricity, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
x4 = land, arable area, hectare 
x5 = other material , 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices)   20 
Table 2. Parameter estimates of the mean normalized output distance function, representing animal 
farm technology.
 10 
 
Coefficient  Variable  Estimate (t-value) 
a0  Corrected intercept  0.36 
a1  x1  0.04 (2.14) 
a2  x2  -0.12 (-2.35) 
a3  x3  -0.05 (-2.25) 
a4  x4  -0.01 (-0.47) 
a5  x5  0.10 (3.73) 
b1  y1  -0.45 (-20.47) 
g1=b1+1  b1  0.55 
a11  x1x1  0.01 (0.90) 
a12  x1x2  -0.08 (-4.37) 
a13  x1x3  -0.003 (-0.26) 
a14  x1x4  0.02 (1.54) 
a15  x1x5  -0.05 (-5.64) 
d11  x1y1  0.02 (2.59) 
h11=d11  x1b1  0.02 
a22  x2x2  0.12 (2.19) 
a23  x2x3  0.002 (0.08) 
a24  x2x4  0.01 (0.45) 
a25  x2x5  -0.07 (-3.16) 
d21  x2y1  0.06 (3.22) 
h21=d21  x2b1  0.06 
a33  x3x3  0.02 (2.76) 
a34  x3x4  -0.02 (-1.54) 
a35  x3x5  -0.01 (-0.75) 
d31  x3y1  0.02 (2.08) 
h31=d31  x3b1  0.02 
a44  x4x4  0.06 (3.00) 
a45  x4x5  0.04 (2.65) 
d41  x4y1  -0.07 (-5.16) 
h41=d41  x4b1  -0.07 
a55  x5x5  -0.03 (-1.41) 
d51  x5y1  0.03 (2.20) 
h51=d51  x5b1  0.03 
b11  y1y1  -0.02 (-1.56) 
m11=b11  y1b1  -0.02 
g11=b11  b1b1  -0.02 
￿2  conventional farm  0.06 (3.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 The parameter estimates of the farm and time specific effects are left out.   21 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the price of negative external effects caused by the animal farming 
sector; mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). 
Compound animal 
farm (N=910) 
Organic animal farm 
(N=53) 
Conventional animal 
farm (N=867) 
Year 
￿
ikt < 0  ￿
ikt < 0  ￿
ikt < 0 
1994-2002  -51.36 
(45.97) 
-72.60 
(97.04) 
-49.87 
(41.62) 
Min  -268.72  -203.51  -257.45 
Max  -0.08  -0.82  -0.03 
￿’  ￿’=-675.45  ￿’
org = -610.24  ￿’
con = -683.20 
*The 1406 observations for which  0 =
ikt t  are excluded when generating these statistics 
 
 
Compound animal 
farm (N=2316) 
Organic animal farm 
(N=230) 
Conventional animal 
farm (N=2086) 
Year 
￿
ikt ￿ 0  ￿
ikt ￿ 0  ￿
ikt ￿ 0 
1994-2002  -20.18 
(38.20) 
-16.73 
(40.96) 
-20.73 
(36.38) 
Min  -268.72  -203.51  -267.45 
Max  0.00  0.00  0.00 
￿’  ￿’=-675.45  ￿’
org = -610.24  ￿’
con = -683.20 
   22 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for technical efficiency and shadow prices of manure in animal farm 
production during 1994-2002 (2000 constant prices); averages and standard deviations (in 
parentheses). 
Compound animal farm (N=2316)  Year 
q
ikt  CD
ikt(.) 
1994-2002  -701.44 
(86.77) 
0.46605 
(0.07391) 
Min  -1164.60  0.00 
Max  -406.73  1.01727 
 
Organic animal farm (N=230)  Year 
q
ikt  CD
ikt(.) 
1994-2002  -661.45 
(96.58) 
0.46605 
(0.08174) 
Min  -1022.57  0.09191 
Max  -406.73  0.87327 
 
Conventional animal farm (N=2086)  Year 
q
ikt  CD
ikt(.) 
1994-2002  -705.84 
(84.50) 
0.46605 
(0.07302) 
Min  -1164.60  0.00 
Max  -415.75  1.01727 
   23 
Table 5. The contribution of agriculture to welfare from animal  farms, 1000 FIM at 2000 constant 
prices; average and standard deviation (in parentheses).  
 
Compound animal farm 
(N=2316) 
Organic animal farm 
(N=230) 
Conventional animal farm 
(N=2086) 
Year 
GNNP
ikt  ￿
ikt
*nee
ikt  GNNP
org,ikt  ￿
org,ikt
*nee
org,ikt  GNNP
con,ikt  ￿
con,ikt
*nee
con,ikt 
94-02  348.99 
(175.43) 
-0.39 
(2.85) 
302.44 
(212.23) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
354.05 
(170.12) 
-0.51 
(3.30) 
Min  1.51  -74.77  1.51  -0.19  3.83  -78.88 
Max  1418.05  0.00  1418.05  0.00  1173.48  0.00 
￿’  ￿’=-675.45  ￿’
org = -610.24  ￿’
con = -683.20 
 
 
  